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Deceptive Liberal Reforms: Institutional Adjustments and the Dynamics of 
Authoritarianism in Tunisia (1997–2005) 
Eric Gobe* 
 
Currently no authoritarian regime south of the Mediterranean is likely to legitimate its rule 
and action independently of the dominant normative discourse praising democracy. 
International institutions and organisations, notably the European Union, have made the rule 
of law and good governance the alpha and omega of their prescriptions and recommendations. 
Consequently, authoritarian rulers now have to pay at least minimal tribute to a number of 
internationally established references1 and cannot violate too obviously the principles 
governing the rule of law or completely eliminate political pluralism. Until the 1980s they still 
benefited from the rhetoric of unanimity inherited from the struggle for independence but 
various difficulties, in particular the confrontation with political Islam, prompted them to 
adopt institutional amendments supposed to ‘provide a remedy for the distance that has 
appeared between the state and society’, though without weakening their grip on power.2 In 
the early 1990s, therefore a certain degree of pluralism emerged in the Maghreb countries, but 
it seems to be largely symbolic and does not allow an actual representation of political forces.  
 In Ben Ali’s Tunisia, the institutional reforms introduced in the 1990s and at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century were presented by the regime as legal and political 
changes that sought to deepen pluralism within existing representative bodies. In reality, 
however, they only institutionalised a controlled pluralism that could not challenge the 
survival of the authoritarian regime. In fact, the changes were conceived so as to make a 
possible change in power unthinkable, while at the same time allowing the regime to talk 
about deepening democracy. Political systems north and south of the Mediterranean converge, 
insofar as the Maghreb countries in general and Tunisia in particular import legal devices that 
govern political institutions in democratic countries, to maintain the fiction of the rule of law 
while preventing the latter’s translation into reality. 
                                                 
*
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In other words, in Tunisia legal formalism participates in a discourse on broadening 
and deepening democracy and the rule of law. In reality, the recent constitutional and 
legislative reform in Tunisia paradoxically ‘limits authoritarian practices while at the same 
time authorising them, indeed legitimating them if necessary.’3 
 
Constitutional Amendments to what End?  
 
Recent amendments to the Tunisian constitution have been conceived and implemented by 
President Ben Ali in relation to the electoral calendar that determines the rhythm of the 
country’s political life. The aim was to include in the constitution provisions to preserve and 
indeed to enlarge the prerogatives of the president of the republic, so as to ensure his ‘re-
election’ while respecting legal forms.  
 
The Constitutional Law of 27 October 1997: Strengthening Presidential Power and 
Extending the Scope of the Referendum 
 
The main provision of the constitutional law of 1997 seeks to extend the referendum to the 
revision of the constitution itself. According to the new article 76, ‘the president of the 
republic can submit proposals for revision of the constitution to referendum.’ Until that point, 
the constitution could be revised only through a vote in parliament on a proposition submitted 
by the president of the republic or by one third of the deputies. This amendment only took on 
its full significance in 2002, when it allowed the head of state to organise a referendum on his 
new proposals for constitutional reform that finally allowed him to stand for a fourth or even a 
fifth term. For an authoritarian regime, ‘consulting the people in this or that form at this or 
that time is not a gratuitous act.’4 Organising a referendum on an issue as important as the 
president’s term of office has a legitimising dimension, be this under Ben Ali or his 
predecessor, Habib Bourguiba; it takes on the value of a plebiscite. 
The provision that broadens the scope of the referendum as a legislative procedure 
also strengthens the president’s constitutional powers.5 Previously, a referendum could be 
called only to reorganise the constitutional framework of the state and to ratify ‘treaties 
having an impact on the working of the institutions.’ According to the new article 47, ‘the 
president of the republic can submit directly to referendum proposals for laws that have 
national importance or affect the superior interest of the country.’ Since the head of state ‘can 
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alone determine this qualification, formulated in particularly general terms, it is legislation at 
large that is now covered by this procedure of semi-direct democracy.’6 
Another constitutional amendment further strengthens the president’s powers by 
redefining the boundary between the domains of legislation and government decree.7 The 
constitution of 1959 explicitly spelled out the prerogatives of the legislature without defining 
a regulatory domain, which meant that in theory, legislation was not confined to the narrow 
limits set by these prerogatives. Henceforth, the new article 35 removes all ambiguity, 
stipulating that ‘matters other than those that are in the domain of law are in the purview of 
the regulatory power.’ Moreover, the president of the republic holds the ultimate power to 
rule by decree (article 53) and has to protect it: he may have the Constitutional Council 
review any bill affecting the domain of rule by decree, and the council must reach a decision 
within ten days (article 35).  
The amendments to article 8 constitutionalise a number of provisions of the law 
governing political parties. On the pretext of ‘consecrating the role of parties in the 
constitution,’8 the new provisions seek to ban any political group that is based, ‘fundamentally 
in its principles, objectives, activity, or programs on a religion, a language, a race, a sex or a 
region’ that do not respect ‘the people’s sovereignty, the values of the republic, human rights, 
and the principles governing personal status affairs’; or that fail to renounce ‘any form of 
violence, fanaticism, racism, or discrimination.’ Similar restrictions are found in the Algerian 
constitution as well as in the Moroccan party law of 2005. The latter explains that parties 
cannot be established on a ‘religious, linguistic, ethnic, or regional basis that is discriminatory 
or contrary to human rights’ (article 4), whereas article 42 of the Algerian constitution states 
that ‘political parties cannot be based on a religious, linguistic racial, gender, corporatist, or 
regional foundation.’ The phrasing is always imprecise and thus allows the regime to 
arbitrarily interpret the law. In fact, these provisions seek principally to exclude from the 
arena of political debate actors who have a popular base, especially Islamist groups, or at least 
those that are likely to contest the supremacy of the governing elites and to position 
themselves as a credible alternative force.  
Following the lines of the 1997 amendments, those of 2002 seek above all to restore – 
without saying so – the presidency for life that the 1976 constitution granted to the late Habib 
Bourguiba and that President Ben Ali abrogated in July 1988.  
 
The Constitutional Reform of 1 June 2002: Restoring the Presidency for Life 
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The constitutional amendments examined by the Chamber of Deputies, sitting in 
extraordinary session on 27 February 2002, include a number of changes, most importantly to 
article 39. Hidden among numerous other changes, the amended article 39 de facto re-
establishes the presidency for life by abolishing the earlier limitation of presidential terms to a 
total of three. 
The other amendments (concerning 39 out of the 80 articles) fall into four categories. 
Some are simple enunciations of general principles or human rights. Thus the revised 
constitution proclaims that ‘the republic guarantees the fundamental freedoms and human 
rights in their universal acceptation’; it also endorses ‘the values of solidarity, mutual aid and 
tolerance among individuals, groups and generations’ (new article 5), which is key to 
president Ben Ali’s discourse of legitimation. The new article 15 stipulates that every ‘citizen 
has a duty to protect the country, to safeguard its independence, its sovereignty, and the 
integrity of the national territory’, allegedly seeking to ‘root’ the ‘duty of loyalty to Tunisia.’9 
The provision allows the regime to persecute opponents who dare to criticise it in foreign 
media. 
Other changes are deceptive and are no more than decoys. The new article 9 states that 
‘the inviolability of the home, the confidentiality of correspondence, and the protection of 
data are guaranteed,’ except, of course, in cases defined by law. Moreover, ‘police custody is 
subject to judicial supervision. Detention is permissible only on order of a judge,’10 but the 
judiciary remains subservient to the executive branch of government. 
The text proposes establishment of a two-round presidential election, but in the 
election of 1999 the two opposition candidates received only 0.52 per cent of the vote;11 
opposition candidates running in the presidential election of 2004 obtained results that were 
only slightly less humiliating.12 
The 2002 reform broadened the powers of the Constitutional Council and 
constitutionalised its composition, which was previously governed by an organic law. The 
new text seems to strengthen the independence of the council. Whereas the organic law of 2 
April 1996 provided for a single authority, the head of state, to appoint all nine members of 
the council, the new article 75 stipulates that four members are designated by the president of 
the republic, two by the president of the Chamber of Deputies (for a renewable period of three 
years), while three others sit ex officio: the first president of the Court of Cassation, the first 
president of the Administrative Tribunal, and the first president of the Court of Accounts. As 
in most democracies, members of the constitutional jurisdiction are barred from exercising 
responsibilities in government or parliament and ‘cannot exercise functions of political or 
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trade union leadership, or activities likely to affect their neutrality or independence.’ Like the 
constitutional courts of some democratic regimes, the council is henceforth supposed to 
supervise and regulate elections. Thus it adjudicates complaints against the election of 
members of both houses of parliament, and it supervises referendums and announces their 
results (new article 72).13 The text of the revision incontestably provides the Constitutional 
Council with new powers insofar as its judgments have henceforth constraining for 
Authorities (new article 75). However, a key question remains: what is the role of a 
constitutional council in an authoritarian political system in which only the head of state may 
request it to issue a ruling? It is true that the reform of the council carries some promise, as 
‘the conditions governing the use of judicial instruments by [institutional] actors are not 
invariants.’14 However, for the time being, the authoritarian environment in which the council 
operates largely attenuates the features that remind us of constitutional courts in democratic 
regimes.  
The third category of amendments allows the president to co-opt more members of his 
clientele by officially establishing an upper house. The new chamber is supposed to ‘double 
representation […], so that the first chamber represents citizens directly, whereas the second 
represents them indirectly through the different components of society.’15 According to the 
new article 19, the Chamber of Counsellors will comprise three sorts of members. The first 
group includes those who are chosen at the governorate level from among elected members of 
local councils. Each governorate sends one or two representatives to the new chamber, 
depending on the size of its population. Another third of members is elected at the national 
level by employers, farmers and salaried employees.16 The third group is appointed by the 
president of the republic from ‘among leading national figures’, to allow Tunisia to benefit 
from ‘the experience and the competence of its people.’17 
The procedure basically prevents any representation of oppositional forces in the 
upper house, since the Democratic Constitutional Rally (DCR) has a quasi-monopoly on 
representation on local councils and controls most of the professional organisations. In the 
first elections to the council on 3 July 2005, all counsellors elected from among local office 
holders were members of the DCR. Nonetheless, an unforeseen glitch jammed the presidential 
machine: the seats reserved for ‘employees’ were not filled because of a boycott by the 
Tunisian General Labour Union (Union générale tunisienne du travail, UGTT). The union 
refused to participate in the elections because the office of the president tried to interfere 
directly in the choice of ‘its’ candidates. In May 2005 the leadership of the UGTT voted 
against the union’s participation in the elections.18 As for the designation of the last third, it 
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indeed illustrated extensive nepotism as, to use a phrase coined by Abdelwahab Hani, 
numerous palace ‘cronies’ were appointed ‘crony-counsellors’.19 Prominent among them are 
DCR lawyers who skim off more benefits than all other members of the profession. For them, 
the second chamber was a godsend, rewarding the most zealous.’20 The third group also 
included representatives of Tunisia’s ‘true-false NGOs’21 and ‘recycles’ several former 
ministers and other dignitaries.22  
Consistent with the 1997 reform, the fourth category of constitutional amendments 
accentuates the preponderance of the president of the republic. Certain provisions strengthen 
his constitutional powers to the detriment of the parliament. The new article 32 assigns to the 
president alone the power to ratify international treaties, while the new article 28 states that 
‘the proposals for laws presented by members of the Chamber of Deputies are not admissible 
when their adoption would result in a reduction of public resources or an increase in taxes, or 
new expenses.’ Article 41 also grants the head of state ‘legal immunity’, while in office, for 
decisions made during the exercise of his duties. 
In debates at committee stage most DCR deputies showed particular zeal when it came 
to proposing amendments to strengthen the powers of the president. The parliamentary 
committee examining the reform project expressed its desire to raise the age limit for 
candidates for president from 70 to 75. Not surprisingly, this proposal was immediately 
accepted by the regime. Combined with the provisions of the new article 39, this amendment 
allowed President Ben Ali (born 3 September 1936) to seek a fifth term in office in 2009. 
Thus the heart of the constitutional reform of 1 June 2002 concerns articles 39 and 40 of the 
constitution, that is, those that govern the election of the head of state.  
The amendments were put to a referendum in order to give additional legitimacy to 
reform presented by President Ben Ali as an ‘historic achievement.’ The results of the 
referendum of 27 May 2002 confirm that the direct consultation of the people is conceived by 
the Tunisian regime as a plebiscite for the president and his policies as, according to official 
figures, the proposed amendments were approved by 99.52 per cent of the voters, with a 
turnout of 99.59 per cent.23 Apart from their unrealistic character, these figures are clear 
indicators of an authoritarian institutionalisation of political expression. The electoral reforms 
and new rules governing political parties adopted between 1992 and 2003 further confirm this 
trend. 
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Electoral Reforms and the Funding of Political Parties: Features of a 
Graciously Granted Pluralism  
 
Recent changes affecting elections and the funding of political parties have continued to 
‘defuse’24 Tunisian politics. With the exception of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), 
the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (le Forum démocratique pour le travail et les 
libertés, FDTL),25 and more recently and to a lesser extent, the Ettajdid movement (formerly 
the Communist Party), the recognised political groups are ‘organs of legitimation for the 
dominant party’ rather than opposition groups.26 President Ben Ali has not only sought to 
avoid political conflict and to construct a malleable opposition that can legitimise his rule; he 
has succeeded in doing so.  
 
The Clientelist Regulation of Party Funding  
 
If Habib Bourguiba paid lip service to pluralism and kept the opposition at a distance, the 
current president has made the opposition his satellite and now keeps it dependent on him.27 
That is the meaning of the 21 July 1997 law governing the funding of political parties. On the 
condition that they are represented in parliament, parties receive an annual allocation divided 
into a fixed amount (60,000 Tunisian dinars – DT) and a variable amount calculated on the 
basis of their number of deputies (5,000 DT per deputy). Opposition deputies mainly 
challenged the provision in the law that excludes from public funding recognised parties 
without deputies even though they participate in elections: ‘When we look at the title of the 
proposed law, it seems clearly inappropriate. Its content concerns [only] parties […] 
represented in the Chamber of Deputies […]. If it is necessary to specify which parties are 
concerned, it would be appropriate to speak of the ‘proposed law on the financing of the 
political parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. […] In addition to its arbitrary 
character overall, this restriction only accentuates the marginalisation of a certain number of 
organisations. We do not understand what governs such a provision and what condemns 
certain parties to renunciation and impotence.’28  
Moreover, political movements receive a set allowance for their newspapers. The law 
is phrased in such a way that the regime has great latitude in distributing these public funds. 
One article provides for an ‘annual subsidy, whose amount is fixed by decree and is allocated 
to political parties as a contribution to the cost of paper and printing for the publication of 
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their newspapers. This subsidy will be paid in four instalments, on condition that publication 
is regular.’29 The latter provision is of considerable importance, because opposition parties 
find it difficult to ensure regular publication of their newspapers. 
Elections constitute a way of compensating the most ‘deserving’ opponents. In the 
legislative elections of 1999 and 2004, no alternative means of funding were available to 
opposition groups. The distribution of seats among these parties is governed by clientelist 
considerations. The most recent changes to the electoral law seek to keep the opposition 
parties dependent on the regime while at the same time fuelling the illusion of a decisive 
advance on the long path to democracy. 
 
An Opposition Quota in Parliament  
 
The mode of election – majority vote for party lists – has remained a constant feature of 
Tunisian electoral law. Obsessed by the threat that the Tunisian nation might explode, the 
leaders of the Néo-Destour party, the ancestor of the DCR, chose this mode of election after 
independence in order to obtain a homogeneous assembly.30 It has always allowed the regime 
party to avoid having its predominance questioned and has transformed elections into mere 
plebiscites on the ruling regime and its policies. The most recent electoral reforms remain 
consistent with this logic.  
An initial reform in 1994 introduced a quota of nineteen seats allocated to opposition 
parties, to be distributed according to their election results. It created the appearance of 
pluralism without fundamentally changing the situation. The allocation of these seats depends 
more on the goodwill of the regime than on the voters. The electoral law thus avoided any 
rivalry between the DCR and the opposition parties; instead, it forced the latter to compete 
with each other. 
The adoption in October 1998 of an organic law completing certain provisions of the 
electoral law simply continued the 1994 reform. The increase in the number of seats reserved 
for the opposition to 20 per cent did not change the rules of the game.31  
In parliamentary debates, some critical voices denounced the absence of consultation 
regarding a reform that seemed to be largely handled by princely fiat: ‘The new parliamentary 
pluralism is in reality the direct result of the political will of the head of state. It is not the 
product of political and ideological pluralism that is anchored in society and the public 
sphere.’32 The most virulent charge against this proposed law came from a member of the 
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Movement of Democratic Socialists (MDS),33 Ahmed Khaskhoussi, who put his finger on the 
contradiction in a law that claims to deepen democracy:  
 
From a logical point of view, it is not normal that only 80 per cent of the seats are 
assigned to [the party] that won 97 per cent of the vote, just as the one that won only 3 
per cent should not be assigned 20 per cent of the seats. Such a system is unjust. In 
fact, injustice consists in giving human beings less than what their rights entitle them 
to. Injustice also consists in attributing to an individual more than (s)he deserves. I 
think our society must not be passive and dependent, living on gifts and donations. 
 
Khaskoussi also denounced the logic of a ‘pluralism of the clientelist type’:  
 
If the leaders of the parties are neither representative nor legitimate, […] the future 
candidates who will automatically represent citizens, no matter what the results of the 
elections are, will know in turn that they have been placed there or appointed. That is 
why they will not only turn their backs on the citizens and public opinion, but worse, 
they will look to those who give them their jobs. What will be most important for them 
is to keep their positions and to survive. As a Tunisian man of letters put it 
metaphorically, ‘they eat the bread and walk on the table.’ Still more, they will appear 
to observers to be ornaments in a decor without beauty.34 
 
The legislative reform does not challenge the DCR’s hegemonic position. In reality, it 
preserves the absolute monopoly of the regime party on the seats assigned by constituency 
and keeps the opposition in a marginal position.35 
The 2003 reform of the electoral law further reduces political competition. Presented 
as a consequence of the constitutional reform of 2002 creating the Chamber of Councellors,36 
it afforded the regime the opportunity to reduce free expression abroad after it had already 
restricted it at home: article 62.3 of the amended electoral law ‘prohibits any person from 
making use during the electoral period of a radio or television station that is private or foreign, 
or broadcasts from abroad for the purpose of calling upon people to vote or to abstain from 
voting in favour of a candidate, or from using the aforementioned television and radio stations 
for the purpose of electoral propaganda.’37 In fact, Tunisian authorities seek to limit the 
impact of satellite television stations that broadcast in Arabic. These media worry the regime 
because they are popular among Tunisians, especially the poorer strata that do not speak 
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French.38 During the May 2002 referendum, satellite television, notably al-Jazeera, provided a 
sounding board for opposition leaders and militant supporters of human rights.39 It provided a 
forum for leaders of outlawed groups like Moncef Marzouki and more outspoken 
representatives of legal parties, like the president of the PDP, Nejib Chebbi, and offered them 
an opportunity to call for a boycott of the referendum. Moreover, the outlawed human rights 
organisation, the National Council for Freedoms in Tunisia (NCFT), pointed out that the law 
did not refer to the electoral campaign but to the electoral ‘period’, which considerably 
extends the length of time concerned.40 The former lasts about two weeks, while the latter 
begins with the official call for elections and ends with the publication of the results, thus 
lasting some three months.41 
 Part of the opposition reacted very strongly; some deputies voted against the text 
proposed to them. Normally, opposition members of parliament simply abstain when they 
disagree with the regime. This time, five representatives of the Ettajdid Movement and 
Mokhtar Jalali, a marginalised member of the Unionist Democratic Union (UDU), voted 
against the reform, while six other deputies abstained.42 Mohamed Harmel, the general 
secretary of the Ettajdid Movement, described the ban on statements from abroad as a 
‘flagrant infringement of free expression.’ To justify the measure, the government had the 
minister of the interior and local development, Hédi M’henni, play on nationalist feelings and 
imply that opponents of this provision were not ‘fervent patriots’:  
 
 [article 62.3] protects national sovereignty by preventing foreign radio and television 
from interfering in our internal affairs […]. This article should be a source of pride 
because what is important is equality among the candidates, the dignity and 
independence of the country with regard to other countries. The electoral question 
should be treated in terms of Tunisian moral values to make it a purely Tunisian affair. 
That is our objective: emancipated countries object to the curiosity of foreigners […]. In 
Canada, politicians and members of parliament spent hardly a quarter of an hour 
discussing such a provision.43 
 
Ultimately, the reform of the electoral law maintains the single-round majority vote for party 
lists and continues to entrust the supervision of the elections to the ministry of the interior and 
its local branches.44 It therefore confirms the crushing domination of the regime and its party 
and makes opposition representatives indebted to presidential favours. The 1999 and 2003 
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constitutional amendments regarding presidential elections further illustrate a pluralism 
graciously granted by the head of state.  
 
Constitutional Amendments Concerned with Purely Formal Competition in 
Presidential Elections 
 
In order to introduce a purely formal competition in the presidential elections of 1999 and 
2004 and to co-opt ‘consensual’ opponents, the regime proceeded to an ‘exceptional’ reform 
of the constitution that enabled the president of the republic to choose acceptable competitors. 
On neither occasion did President Ben Ali take the risk of introducing new conditions for 
candidacy in the presidential election. Paragraph 3 of article 40 of the constitution requires 
presidential candidates to obtain the sponsorship of thirty elected officials (deputies or 
presidents of local councils), a condition that no opposition party has been able to fulfil in the 
history of independent Tunisia. The approval of ad hoc constitutional laws allowed President 
Ben Ali to temporarily lift this requirement without losing control of the procedure that 
governed the selection of his competitors.  
In 1999, extremely restrictive conditions were imposed: only the leaders of political 
parties (the secretary general or the president) could stand for election, and only if they had 
held this position for at least five years at the time they officially declared candidacy. 
Moreover, they had to be less than seventy years old, and their parties had to have a least one 
deputy.45 These conditions allowed the president to choose two acceptable competitors: 
Mohamed Belhaj Amor, president of the Popular Unity Party (PUP), and Abderrahmane Tlili, 
secretary general of the UDU.46 
In 2003, the right to stand for election was no longer limited solely to leaders of 
political parties. The new text states that on the day he declares, a candidate for election must 
have been a member of the executive leadership of his party for at least five years without 
interruption, and that his party must be represented in the Chamber of Deputies.  
In accord with their status as client-parties, the opposition groups in parliament, with 
the exception of the Ettajdid Movement, expressed relative satisfaction with the ad hoc 
amendments. Thus Mustapha Bouaouaja, a PUP deputy, declared that ‘The opening up of the 
competition for the highest constitutional office […] constitutes an additional step in a process 
in which we have participated with a faith that allows us to imagine a bright future for a 
country in which the choice and the will of the people will be respected.’47 
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 Major criticism came from the Ettajdid Movement (five deputies) and from Mokhtar 
Jalali. Denouncing the need for sponsorship, Jalali attacked the DCR and the police state: 
 
The impossibility for any [opposition] candidate in the presidential elections to collect a 
sufficient number of sponsorships from deputies and presidents of local councils is not 
only an indication of the opposition’s weakness, but also of the fact that the opposition 
cannot develop in a climate marked by the quasi-absolute domination of a single party 
that makes use of the state apparatus, including the official or semi-official media, 
controls the administration and the various institutions of the country […]. The 
opposition is incapable of attracting supporters and exerting influence, no matter what 
its program and its slogans, in a context […] of continual surveillance where the police 
spies on everything it does.48  
 
The two other legalised opposition parties not represented in the Chamber of Deputies 
vigorously denounced the law. The day before the parliamentary vote, Nejib Chebbi 
announced in a press conference that he had sent a letter to all deputies urging them to reject 
the law and to vote for an alternative proposal that would open the way to pluralism, free 
political participation and a peaceful transition of power. The head of the PDP proposed to 
follow the example of Portugal, where a candidate only needs to be sponsored by 7,500 
citizens. As for Mustafa Ben Jaafar, the president of the FDTL, he drew the bitter conclusion 
that the palace in Carthage had become ‘an air-tight lockup with zero risk’ and predicted 
another ‘simulacrum of an election.’49 
In sum, the analysis of recent institutional change shows the extent to which legal 
formalism and constitutionalism participate in the reproduction and the dynamics of 
authoritarianism. Official Tunisian discourse on democracy and representation is situated in 
the framework of a repressive conception of law in which the rulers seek to ‘protect 
themselves against possible “excesses” committed by ordinary citizens and by organised 
groups.’50 The laws that allegedly seek to improve representation are conceived in such a way 
as to prevent opposition actors from taking advantage of their seemingly liberal provisions. In 
the words of Michel Camau, legislation governing political institutions in Tunisia is 
characterised by ‘a distortion between its conceptual universe, which is that of 
constitutionalism, and the weak legal tenor of its organisational content’.51 Consequently this 
legislation, contrary to that of countries north of the Mediterranean, does not perform ‘a 
function of effective protection and guarantee’ and does not establish a system of ‘brakes that 
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are effective and normalised.’52 Insofar as it does not constitute ‘a formula for mediation and 
representation of social conflicts by the state,’ but ‘a system of representing the state in its 
relationship to society,’53 it performs chiefly a function of legitimising the state and the elites 
that run it. It appears all the more plastic and unstable as the political calendar and the 
survival of the authoritarian regime dictate the rhythm and the nature of institutional changes. 
These legal gymnastics fool hardly anyone, inside or outside the country, and convince only 
those who want to be convinced. Tunisia’s European partners, however, are more than willing 
to accept this kind of practice so as not to disturb the economic and security co-operation 
between the northern and southern sides of the Mediterranean. 
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